Gender Differences in Negotiation: Evidence from Real Estate Transactions

Steffen Andersen, Julie Marx, Kasper Meisner Nielsen and Lise Vesterlund

No 27318, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We investigate negotiations over real estate and find that men secure better prices than women when negotiating to buy and sell property. However, the gender difference declines substantially when improving controls for the property’s value; and is eliminated when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in a sample of repeated sales. Rather than evidence of gender differences in negotiation, the initial difference in prices is evidence that men and women demand different properties. Consistently we find no gender difference in the sales price secured for property inherited from a deceased parent. Provided appropriate controls men and women fare equally well when negotiating over real estate. Our study demonstrates that inference on gender differences in negotiation relies critically on controlling for the value of the negotiated item.

JEL-codes: J16 R30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gen and nep-ure
Note: LS PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published as Steffen Andersen & Julie Marx & Kasper Meisner Nielsen & Lise Vesterlund, 2021. "Gender Differences in Negotiation: Evidence from Real Estate Transactions," The Economic Journal, vol 131(638), pages 2304-2332.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Gender Differences in Negotiation: Evidence from Real Estate Transactions (2021)
Working Paper: Gender Differences in Negotiation: Evidence fro Real Estate Transactions (2018)
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