Political Power, Elite Control, and Long-Run Development: Evidence from Brazil

Claudio Ferraz, Frederico Finan and Monica Martinez-Bravo

No 27456, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper analyzes how changes in the concentration of political power affect long-run development. We study Brazil’s military dictatorship whose rise to power dramatically altered the distribution of power of local political elites. We document that municipalities that were more politically concentrated prior to the dictatorship in the 1960s are relatively richer in 2000, despite being poorer initially. Our evidence suggests that this reversal of fortune was the result of the military’s policies aimed at undermining the power of traditional elites. These policies increased political competition locally, which ultimately led to better governance, more public goods, and higher income levels.

JEL-codes: D72 N46 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-lam and nep-pol
Note: DEV POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political Power, Elite Control, and Long-Run Development: Evidence from Brazil (2024)
Working Paper: Political Power, Elite Control, and Long-Run Development: Evidence from Brazil (2020)
Working Paper: Political Power, Elite Control, and Long-Run Development: Evidence from Brazil (2020)
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