Electoral Concerns Reduce Restrictive Measures During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Massimo Pulejo and Pablo Querubin

No 27498, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The outbreak of COVID-19 has called for swift action by governments, often involving the adoption of restrictive measures such as lockdowns. In this context, leaders have faced a trade-off between imposing stringent measures to limit the contagion, and minimizing the costs on their national economy, which could impact their electoral prospects. Leveraging on both the timing of elections and the constitutional term limits faced by leaders, we document how incumbents who can run for re-election implement less stringent restrictions when the election is closer in time. The effect is driven by measures more likely to have a negative economic impact. This shows how electoral concerns help explain the observed differences in the response to COVID-19 across different countries.

JEL-codes: D72 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Massimo Pulejo & Pablo Querubín, 2021. "Electoral concerns reduce restrictive measures during the COVID-19 pandemic," Journal of Public Economics, vol 198.

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