The Impact of Social Security on Pension Claiming and Retirement: Active vs. Passive Decisions

Rafael Lalive, Arvind Magesan and Stefan Staubli

No 27616, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We exploit a unique Swiss reform to identify the importance of passivity, claiming social security benefits at the Full Retirement Age (FRA). Sharp discontinuities generated by the reform reveal that raising the FRA while imposing small early claiming penalties significantly delays pension claiming and retirement, but imposing large penalties and holding the FRA fixed does not. The nature of the reform allows us to identify that between 47 and 69% of individuals are passive, while imposing additional structure point identifies the fraction at 67%. An original survey of Swiss pensioners reveals that reference-dependent preferences is the main source of passivity.

JEL-codes: H55 J21 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-eur, nep-lma and nep-pbe
Note: AG LS PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: The Impact of Social Security on Pension Claiming and Retirement: Active vs. Passive Decisions (2020)
Working Paper: The Impact of Social Security on Pension Claiming and Retirement: Active vs. Passive Decisions (2020)
Working Paper: The Impact of Social Security on Pension Claiming and Retirement: Active vs. Passive Decisions (2020)
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