What Makes a Tax Evader?

Marcelo Bergolo, Martin Leites, Ricardo Perez-Truglia and Matias Strehl

No 28235, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Why do some individuals choose to evade taxes while others do not? In collaboration with Uruguay’s national tax agency, we use unique data to address this question. Drawing on third-party reports, we measure income underreporting at the individual level as an indicator of tax evasion. We also collect novel survey data and link it to administrative records at the individual level. We then examine which metrics, if any, best predict tax evasion. Using survey questions and incentivized laboratory games, we measure traits such as honesty and selfishness. These traits exhibit little predictive power. In contrast, the behavior of former and current coworkers, as well as economic factors such as the marginal tax rate, are stronger predictors.

JEL-codes: H24 H26 K42 Z1 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-iue, nep-lam, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-soc
Note: LE PE
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w28235.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28235

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w28235

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().