How do Physicians Respond to Malpractice Allegations? Evidence from Florida Emergency Departments

Caitlin Carroll, David Cutler and Anupam Jena

No 28330, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The general deterrence effects of malpractice laws on physician behavior have been extensively studied but may lack salience for physicians. We study the role of specific deterrence in malpractice liability by examining how physicians respond to being accused of malpractice. With the universe of data on patient care and malpractice complaints for Florida emergency physicians, we find that physicians oversee 9% fewer discharges after allegations and treat each discharge 5% more expensively. Effects are similar for paid claims and dropped accusations. Increases in treatment are generalized, i.e., not limited to conditions similar to what the physician is reported for.

JEL-codes: I11 J44 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-lma
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