The Two Faces of Information

Gaetano Gaballo and Guillermo Ordonez

No 28489, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In absence of insurance contracts to share risk, public information is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it empowers self-insurance as agents better react to shocks, reducing risk. On the other hand, it weakens market-insurance as common knowledge of shocks restricts trading risk. We embody these two faces of information in a single general-equilibrium model. We characterize the conditions under which market-insurance is superior, and then public information – even though costless and precise – is socially undesirable. In the absence of information, however, market-insurance is still underprovided as individuals fail to internalize its general equilibrium benefits.

JEL-codes: D52 D53 D62 D8 E21 G11 G12 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ias, nep-mac and nep-mic
Note: EFG ME
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Working Paper: The Two Faces of Information (2017)
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