Collusion, Mergers, and Related Antitrust Issues

John Asker and Volker Nocke

No 29175, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This survey examines recent developments in economic research relating to antitrust, paying specific attention to research in the areas of collusion and merger enforcement. Research relating to both collusion and mergers has made significant advances in the last twenty years. With respect to collusion, this includes important theoretical and empirical work on the sustainability, structure, and impact of collusive schemes. With respect to mergers, this includes important work on the impact of enforcement institutions, both theoretical and empirical work on unilateral effects, and theoretical work on the selection of which mergers get proposed to antitrust agencies and optimal policy in the face of that selection. A feature of recent research is the increasing complementarity between empirical work (ranging from observational studies to model-based measurement) and theoretical work in advancing our understanding of collusive and merger-related phenomena.

JEL-codes: K21 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-isf and nep-reg
Note: IO
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published as John Asker, Volker Nocke, Chapter 12 - Collusion, mergers, and related antitrust issues☆☆We would like to thank Lorenzo Cattivelli, Masha Melkonyan, and Kylie Toh for excellent research assistance. We are deeply grateful for comments from Luís Cabral, Joe Harrington, Nathan Miller, Rob Porter, Devesh Raval, Nicolas Schutz, and Lucy White. Nocke gratefully acknowledges financial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) through CRC TR 224 (Project B03). The usual caveat applies., Editor(s): Kate Ho, Ali Hortaçsu, Alessandro Lizzeri, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 5, Issue 1, 2021, Pages 177-279

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