Should We Have Automatic Triggers for Unemployment Benefit Duration And How Costly Would They Be?

Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Peter Ganong and Jonathan Gruber

No 29703, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We model automatic trigger policies for unemployment insurance by simulating a weekly panel of individual labor market histories, grouped by state. We reach three conclusions: (i) policies designed to trigger immediately at the onset of a recession result in benefit extensions that occur in less sick labor markets than the historical average for benefit extensions; (ii) the ad hoc extensions in the 2001 and 2007-09 recessions in total cover a similar number of additional weeks as common proposals for automatic triggers, but concentrate coverage more in weaker labor markets; (iii) compared to ex post policy, the cost of common proposals for automatic triggers is close to zero.

JEL-codes: E24 E32 E62 H53 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-mac
Note: EFG ME PE
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as Gabriel Chodorow-Reich & Peter Ganong & Jonathan Gruber, 2022. "Should We Have Automatic Triggers for Unemployment Benefit Duration and How Costly Would They Be?," AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol 112, pages 112-116.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w29703.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Should We Have Automatic Triggers for Unemployment Benefit Duration and How Costly Would They Be? (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29703

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w29703

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().