Teacher Labor Market Policy and the Theory of the Second Best

Michael Bates, Michael Dinerstein, Andrew Johnston and Isaac Sorkin

No 29728, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We estimate a matching model of teachers and elementary schools with rich data on teacher applications and principal ratings from a large, urban district in North Carolina. Both teachers’ and principals’ preferences deviate from those that would maximize the achievement of economically disadvantaged students: teachers prefer schools with fewer disadvantaged students, and principal ratings are weakly related to teacher effectiveness. In equilibrium, these two deviations combine to produce a surprisingly equitable current allocation, where teacher quality is balanced across advantaged and disadvantaged students. To close achievement gaps, policies that address deviations on one side alone are ineffective or harmful, while policies that address both could substantially increase the achievement of disadvantaged students.

JEL-codes: I28 J08 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma and nep-ure
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Working Paper: Teacher labor market policy and the theory of the second best (2023)
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