Allocating Scarce Information

Richard Holden, Anup Malani and Chris Teh

No 29846, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Sender conveys scarce information to a number of receivers to maximize the sum of receiver payoffs. Each receiver’s payoff depends on the state of the world and an action she takes. The optimal action is state contingent. Under mild regularity conditions, we show that the payoff of each receiver is convex in the amount of information she receives. Thus, it is optimal for Sender to target information to a single receiver. We then study four extensions in which interior information allocations are optimal.

JEL-codes: D60 D61 D80 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: PE
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