Property Rights in Historical Political Economy: When do Wedges Wither?

Lee Alston and Bernardo Mueller

No 29991, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Countries are not equally developed in large part because most countries face sets of property rights that do not foster growth despite the aggregate gains that would result from changing property rights. The difference in rents to society between the extant set of property rights and some seemingly better alternative we define as a “Demsetz” wedge. We explore the forces that sustain the status quo as well the forces that prompt property rights to change.

JEL-codes: N0 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
Note: DAE DEV
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w29991.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29991

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w29991

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().