Dangerous Prescribing and Healthcare Fragmentation: Evidence from Opioids

Keith Marzilli Ericson, Adam Sacarny and R. Annetta Zhou

No 29992, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Fragmented healthcare received from many different physicians results in higher costs and lower quality, but does it contribute to dangerous opioid prescribing? The effect is theoretically ambiguous because fragmentation can trigger costly coordination failures but also permits greater specialization. We examine dangerous opioid prescribing, defined as receiving high dosages, long prescription durations, or harmfully interacting medications. Cross-sectionally, regions with higher fragmentation have lower levels of dangerous opioid prescribing. This relationship is associational and may result from unobserved patient-level confounders. Identifying the impact of healthcare fragmentation by examining patients who move across regions, we find a relatively precise null effect of fragmentation on dangerous opioid prescribing. These results cast doubt on the role of fragmentation in this phenomenon and highlight the potential role of other forces in driving it.

JEL-codes: I11 I12 L14 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ind
Note: AG EH
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Published as Keith Marzilli Ericson & Adam Sacarny & Annetta Zhou, 2023. "Dangerous prescribing and healthcare fragmentation: Evidence from opioids," Journal of Public Economics, vol 225.

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