Politics At Work

Emanuele Colonnelli, Valdemar Pinho Neto and Edoardo Teso

No 30182, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study how individual political views shape firm behavior and labor market outcomes using new micro-data from Brazil. We first show that business owners are considerably more likely to employ copartisan workers. This phenomenon is in part driven by the overlapping of political and social networks. Multiple tests—a survey, an event study, analyses of wage premia and promotions within the firm, and a field experiment—further highlight how business owners’ political preferences directly influence firms’ employment decisions. A channel of political discrimination appears more relevant than one of political quid-pro-quo between firms and politicians.

JEL-codes: D22 D72 D73 G0 G3 G4 J0 J15 J2 J3 J7 O0 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma and nep-pol
Note: CF DEV IO LE LS PE POL PR
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