A Study of Bid-rigging in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Indonesia, Georgia, Mongolia, Malta, and State of California

Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi and Daichi Shimamoto

No 30271, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We apply a Regression Discontinuity based approach to screen for collusion developed in Kawai et al. (2022) to public procurement data from five countries. We find that bidders who win by a very small margin have significantly lower backlog than those who lose by a very small margin in the sample of procurement auctions from Indonesia, suggesting that bidders collude by bid rotation. Our results suggest that the proportion of noncompetitive auctions is at least about 5% for all E-procurement auctions and about 3% for all auctions in Indonesia. We cannot reject the null of competition in other countries.

JEL-codes: L41 O52 O53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-com, nep-des, nep-ind and nep-sea
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