Corporate Political Spending and State Tax Policy: Evidence from Citizens United

Cailin R. Slattery, Alisa Tazhitdinova and Sarah Robinson

No 30352, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: To what extent is U.S. state tax policy affected by corporate political contributions? The 2010 Supreme Court Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ruling provides an exogenous shock to corporate campaign spending, allowing corporations to spend on elections in 23 states which previously had spending bans. Ten years after the ruling and for a wide range of outcomes, we are not able to identify economically or statistically significant effects of corporate independent expenditures on state tax policy, including tax rates, discretionary tax breaks, and tax revenues.

JEL-codes: D72 H20 H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
Note: PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Cailin Slattery & Alisa Tazhitdinova & Sarah Robinson, 2023. "Corporate political spending and state tax policy: Evidence from Citizens United," Journal of Public Economics, vol 221.

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Journal Article: Corporate political spending and state tax policy: Evidence from Citizens United (2023)
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