Nudging the Nudger: Performance Feedback and Organ Donor Registrations

Julian House, Nicola Lacetera, Mario Macis and Nina Mazar

No 30547, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In a randomized controlled trial (RCT) conducted in three waves over 2.5 years and involving nearly 700 customer-service representatives (CSRs) from a Canadian government service agency, we studied how providing CSRs with repeated performance feedback, with or without peer comparison, affected their subsequent organ donor registration rates. The feedback resulted in a 25% increase in daily signups compared to otherwise equivalent encouragements and reminders. Adding benchmark information about peer performance did not amplify or diminish this effect. We observed increased registration rates for both high and low performers. A post-intervention survey indicates that CSRs in all conditions found the information included in the treatments helpful and motivating and that signing up organ donors makes their job more meaningful. We also found suggestive evidence that performance feedback with benchmark information was the most motivating and created the least pressure to perform.

JEL-codes: C93 D90 H41 I10 J45 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
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Published as Julian House & Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis & Nina Mazar, 2024. "Nudging the Nudger: Performance Feedback and Organ Donor Registrations," Journal of Health Economics, .

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Journal Article: Nudging the nudger: Performance feedback and organ donor registrations (2024)
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