Councils and Indirect Rule in British Africa

Jutta Bolt, Leigh Gardner, Jennifer Kohler, Jack Paine and James Robinson

No 30582, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Did Western colonial rule transform African political institutions? Despite extensive research on indirect rule, we have little systematic evidence about how colonizers’ aims interacted with the structure of indigenous institutions to shape local governance. We explain why colonizers faced incentives to delegate authority to traditionally legitimate institutions, even in historically decentralized areas. Empirically, we analyze originally compiled data on African political institutions in the precolonial and colonial periods for more than 450 subnational units across British Africa. We focus on councils as a form of executive constraints. Subnational councils were widespread, highly correlated with precolonial institutions and patterns of socioeconomic development, and exerted meaningful decision-making powers. These indirect-rule institutions reflected reforms to replace ineffective installed agents. Pressure from below prompted British officials to reintroduce systems of executive constraints based on precolonial models. Our findings contrast with the widespread claim that colonizers could unilaterally implement indirect-rule institutions while disregarding precolonial precedents.

JEL-codes: D7 H1 P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-gro and nep-his
Note: POL
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