Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives

Miguel Anton, Florian Ederer, Mireia Gine and Martin Schmalz

No 30785, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industry and intra-firm cross-market variation in prices, output, markups, and market shares that is consistent with empirical evidence. The organizational structure of multiproduct firms and the passivity of common owners determine whether higher prices under common ownership result from higher costs or from higher markups. Using panel regressions and a difference-in-differences design we document that managerial incentives are less performance-sensitive in firms with more common ownership.

JEL-codes: D21 G32 J33 L13 L21 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-com, nep-hrm, nep-ind, nep-lma and nep-reg
Note: CF IO LE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published as Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, 2023. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, vol 131(5), pages 1294-1355.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (2023)
Working Paper: Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (2018)
Working Paper: Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (2017)
Working Paper: Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (2016)
Working Paper: Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (2016)
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