Man vs. Machine: Technological Promise and Political Limits of Automated Regulation Enforcement

Oliver Browne, Ludovica Gazze, Michael Greenstone and Olga Rostapshova

No 30816, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: New technologies allow perfect detection of environmental violations at near-zero marginal cost, but take-up is low. We conducted a field experiment to evaluate enforcement of water conservation rules with smart meters in Fresno, CA. Households were randomly assigned combinations of enforcement method (automated or in-person inspections) and fines. Automated enforcement increased households’ punishment rates from 0.1 to 14%, decreased summer water use by 3%, and reduced violations by 17%, while higher fine levels had little effect. However, automated enforcement also increased customer complaints by 1,102%, ultimately causing its cancellation and highlighting that political considerations limit technological solutions to enforcement challenges.

JEL-codes: K42 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-exp and nep-reg
Note: EEE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Man vs. Machine: Technological Promise and Political Limits of Automated Regulation Enforcement (2022)
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