Reducing Administrative Barriers Increases Take-up of Subsidized Health Insurance Coverage: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Keith Marzilli Ericson, Timothy Layton, Adrianna McIntyre and Adam Sacarny

No 30885, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Administrative barriers to social insurance program take-up are pervasive, including in subsidized health insurance. We conducted a randomized controlled trial with Massachusetts’ Affordable Care Act marketplace to reduce these barriers and other behavioral frictions. We find that a “check the box” streamlined enrollment intervention raises enrollment by 11%, more than personalized reminder letters (7.9% increase) or generic reminder letters (4.5% increase). Effects are concentrated among individuals eligible for zero-premium plans, who faced no further administrative burdens of setting up payments. Producing this enrollment effect through premium reduction would cost about $6 million in subsidies, highlighting the importance of these burdens.

JEL-codes: D73 I13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hea
Note: EH PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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