Donor Contracting Conditions and Public Procurement: Causal Evidence from Kenyan Electrification

Catherine Wolfram, Edward Miguel, Eric Hsu and Susanna Berkouwer

No 30948, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: There is limited causal evidence on the effects of different public procurement regulations on project quality and value-for-money for projects funded by national governments and foreign aid donors. This paper uses policy and experimental variation to study how two key contracting features—namely, contract bundling and monitoring—affect outcomes of a large economic development project. We leverage an unusual feature of Kenya’s nationwide electrification program: the quasi-random allocation of multilateral funding sources across nearby villages. African Development Bank (AfDB) projects used bundled contracts while the World Bank (WB) employed unbundled contracts together with strengthened inspections. To measure impacts, we collect on-the-ground engineering assessments, power quality data, household surveys, and analyze original contracts. The analysis suggests a stark trade-off: WB procedures delayed construction completion by 16 months relative to AfDB sites but improved construction quality by a sizeable 0.6 standard deviations. To disentangle the effects of contract bundling versus monitoring, we conducted randomized audits that enhanced monitoring. The audits improve household connectivity, network size, and voltage at AfDB sites, but have no impact at WB sites, suggesting monitoring and unbundling contracts may be substitutes. Given the apparent trade-off, we investigate how net benefits depend on policymaker time preferences and infrastructure longevity.

JEL-codes: D73 F35 H5 L94 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-dev, nep-ene, nep-exp and nep-ppm
Note: DEV EEE IO PE
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