Cross-State Strategic Voting

Gordon Dahl, Joseph Engelberg, Runjing Lu and William Mullins

No 30972, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We estimate that 3.1% of US voters, or 6.1 million individuals, were registered to vote in two states in 2020, opening up the possibility for them to choose where to vote. Double registrants are concentrated in the wealthiest zipcodes and respond to both incentives and costs, disproportionately choosing to vote in swing states (higher incentive) and states which automatically send out mail-in ballots (lower cost). We call this behavior Cross-State Strategic Voting. While others have documented strategic incentives on who to vote for, this paper is the first to consider strategic incentives on where to vote.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: LE PE POL
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