Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions

Rocco Macchiavello and Ameet Morjaria

No 30978, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Relational contracts - informal self-enforcing agreements sustained by repeated interactions - are ubiquitous both within and across organizational boundaries. This review highlights recent empirical contributions in selected areas. We begin by reviewing some recent work that explicitly takes the dynamic incentive compatibility constraints that underpin relational contract models to the data. We then discuss the relationship between relational contracting and firms' performance. We conclude pointing in directions that we consider to be particularly ripe for future work.

JEL-codes: D86 F14 L14 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-hrm
Note: DEV PR
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Rocco Macchiavello & Ameet Morjaria, 2022. "Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol 178(Online First).

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w30978.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions (2023)
Working Paper: Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions (2023)
Working Paper: Relational contracts: recent empirical advancements and open questions (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30978

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w30978

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().