International Sanctions and Dollar Dominance

Javier Bianchi and Cesar Sosa-Padilla

No 31024, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We propose a simple monetary model to investigate the implications of international financial sanctions for the preeminence of the US dollar in the international financial system. We show how the anticipation of financial sanctions can reduce the US dollar convenience yield and the holdings of US dollar assets. We also evaluate the implications for welfare and show that they are generally detrimental for all countries.

JEL-codes: E42 F31 F32 F34 F41 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-ifn, nep-mon and nep-opm
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Working Paper: International Sanctions and Dollar Dominance (2023)
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