Logrolling in Congress

Marco Battaglini, Valerio Leone Sciabolazza and Eleonora Patacchini

No 31169, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study vote trading among U.S. Congress members. By tracking roll-call votes within bills across five legislatures and politicians' personal connections made during the school years, we document a propensity of connected legislators to vote together that depends on how salient the bill is to the politicians' legislative agenda. Although this activity does not seem to enhance U.S. Congress members' legislative effectiveness, vote trading is a strong predictor of future promotions to position of leadership.

JEL-codes: D72 D74 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-soc
Note: POL
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Working Paper: Logrolling in Congress (2023)
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