Two-Sided Market Power in Firm-to-Firm Trade

Vanessa Alviarez, Michele Fioretti, Ken Kikkawa and Monica Morlacco

No 31253, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of bargaining in firm-to-firm trade with two-sided market power. The framework accommodates flexible market structures, yielding analytical expressions for pair-specific markups and pass-through elasticities. In U.S. import data, we estimate strong importer bargaining power and an upward-sloping export supply curve, consistent with oligopsony power. Pass-through of the 2018 tari!s in firm-to-firm relationships is incomplete, in contrast to product-level studies, primarily due to exporter cost reductions driven by falling demand from dominant buyers. Our study highlights how bargaining and network rigidities shape price outcomes, with implications for markup dispersion and shock propagation in global value chains.

JEL-codes: F12 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-int
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Two-Sided Market Power in Firm-to-Firm Trade (2023)
Working Paper: Two-Sided Market Power in Firm-to-Firm Trade (2022)
Working Paper: Two-Sided Market Power in Firm-to-Firm Trade (2022)
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