Campaign Connections

Samuel Bazzi and Claudio Labanca

No 31283, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper explores the labor market returns to working for a victorious political campaign. Using unique administrative data from Brazil, we track the earnings and employment of campaign workers before and after close elections spanning nearly 20 years. We identify sizable returns to working for a winning campaign, especially in areas with a large informal sector and for workers connected to newly elected challengers. The returns are concentrated in the public sector, where connected hires are relatively more qualified. Our results suggest that campaign connections facilitate the hiring of capable but inexperienced workers in the public sector through relational contracting.

JEL-codes: D72 D73 J45 J46 O17 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma, nep-mfd and nep-pol
Note: DEV LS PE POL
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Related works:
Working Paper: Campaign Connections (2023)
Working Paper: Campaign Connections (2023)
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