Consumer Surveillance and Financial Fraud

Bo Bian, Michaela Pagel, Huan Tang and Devesh Raval

No 31692, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In today’s digital economy, firms continuously collect, store, share, and sell personal data, exposing customers to risks of financial fraud. Leveraging Apple’s App Tracking Transparency policy as a natural experiment, we show that restricting data tracking and sharing significantly reduces consumer fraud complaints, particularly those involv-ing personal information misuse. Effects are stronger in areas dominated by firms with risky data practices and coincide with a decline in dark web discussions and higher prices for sensitive data. By tracing effects along the fraud supply chain, our find-ings suggest that data regulations can benefit consumers by constraining the flow of exploitable information.

JEL-codes: G5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09
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Note: CF LE
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