Institutional Drift, Property Rights, and Economic Development: Evidence from Historical Treaties

Donna Feir, Rob Gillezeau and Maggie Jones

No 31713, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: For nearly three centuries, Indigenous peoples within the borders of present-day Canada engaged in treaty-making with the British Crown and other European powers. These treaties regularly formed the colonial legal basis for access to Indigenous lands. However, treaties were not negotiated everywhere, including in regions subsequently settled by Europeans. Consequentially, there is substantial regional variation in the legal status of occupied lands, jurisdiction over natural resources, and state commitments to Indigenous nations. We study how these legal institutions have shaped the path of economic development in Indigenous communities. Using restricted-access census data, we show that historical treaties substantially lower income in Indigenous communities today. We argue that this results from the constitutional and legal recognition of Aboriginal rights and title, which have dramatically increased bargaining power and, consequently, income growth in non-treaty Indigenous communities.

JEL-codes: J15 N31 N32 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-gro, nep-his, nep-lab and nep-ure
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