Real Effects of Rollover Risk: Evidence from Hotels in Crisis

Anthony DeFusco, Charles G. Nathanson and Michael Reher

No 31764, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We analyze and find empirical support for a model of strategic renegotiation in which firms scheduled to roll over debt during a crisis reduce operations to discourage lenders from seizing the collateral. Our empirical analysis exploits contractual features of commercial mortgages that generate exogenous variation in whether debt matures during a crisis. A crisis debt maturity causes large relative drops in output, labor, and profits at the collateral property, even holding the borrower fixed. Consistent with the model, these real effects decrease with the lender’s operating adjustment costs, reverse after renegotiation, and occur primarily for highly-levered loans without term-extension options.

JEL-codes: G01 G3 R3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
Note: CF
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