Professional Motivations in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Officers

Aaron Chalfin and Felipe M. Gonçalves

No 31985, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study how public sector workers balance their professional motivations with private economic concerns, focusing on police arrests. Arrests made near the end of an officer's shift typically require overtime work, and officers respond by reducing arrest frequency but increasing arrest quality. Days in which an officer works a second job after their police shift have higher opportunity cost, also reducing late-shift arrests. Combining our estimates in a dynamic model identifies officer preferences over workplace activity and overtime work. Our results indicate that officers' private costs of arrests have a first-order impact on the quantity and quality of enforcement.

JEL-codes: J33 J45 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-lma and nep-ure
Note: LE LS PE POL
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