Financial Integration and Monetary Policy Coordination

Javier Bianchi and Louphou Coulibaly

No 32009, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Financial integration generates macroeconomic spillovers that may require international monetary policy coordination. We show that individual central banks may set nominal interest rates too low or too high relative to the cooperative outcome. We identify three sufficient statistics that determine whether the Nash equilibrium exhibits under-tightening or over-tightening: the output gap, sectoral differences in labor intensity, and the trade balance response to changes in nominal rates. We find that, independently of the shocks hitting the economy, under-tightening is possible during economic expansions or contractions. For large shocks, the gains from coordination can be substantial.

JEL-codes: E21 E23 E43 E44 E52 E62 F32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-fdg, nep-gth, nep-ifn, nep-mon and nep-opm
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