Content Moderation with Opaque Policies

Scott Kominers and Jesse Shapiro

No 32156, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A sender sends a signal about a state to a receiver who takes an action that determines a payoff. A moderator can block some or all of the sender's signal before it reaches the receiver. When the moderator's policy is transparent to the receiver, the moderator can improve the payoff by blocking false or harmful signals. When the moderator's policy is opaque, however, the receiver may not trust the moderator. In that case, the moderator can guarantee an improved outcome only by blocking signals that enable harmful acts. Blocking signals that encourage false beliefs can be counterproductive.

JEL-codes: D47 D82 D83 L82 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: IO POL PR
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