Competitive Job Seekers: When Sharing Less Leaves Firms at a Loss

Gaurav Chiplunkar, Erin M. Kelley and Gregory V. Lane

No 32171, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study how job-seekers share information about jobs within their social network, and its implications for firms. We randomly increase the amount of competition for a job and find that job-seekers are less likely to share information about the job, especially with their high ability peers. This lowers the quality of applicants, hires, and performance on the job — suggesting that firms who disseminate job information through social networks may see lower quality applicants than expected for their most competitive positions. While randomly offering higher wages attracts better talent, it is not able to fully overcome these strategic disincentives in information sharing.

JEL-codes: L14 M51 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-net and nep-ure
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