Who Gets the Job? The Consequences of Strategic Information Sharing within Social Networks

Gaurav Chiplunkar, Erin M. Kelley and Gregory V. Lane

No 32171, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study how job-seekers share information about jobs within their social network, and its implications for the quality of applicants and hires. We randomly increase the amount of competition for a job that we created and find that jobseekers are less likely to share information about the job, especially with their high ability peers. This lowers the quality of applicants, hires, and performance on the job — suggesting that disseminating job information through social networks may result in lower quality applicants than expected for competitive positions. While randomly offering higher wages attracts better talent, it is not able to fully overcome these strategic disincentives.

JEL-codes: L14 M51 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-net and nep-ure
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