Discrimination During Eviction Moratoria

Alina Arefeva, Kay Jowers, Qihui Hu and Christopher Timmins

No 32289, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We merge a hand-collected dataset on state-level eviction policies with a nationwide field experiment of over 25,000 rental inquiries to study how enforcement constraints affect screening in rental markets. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation from the staggered repeal of moratoria, we show that property managers discriminated more against minority renters when eviction—the primary enforcement mechanism—was suspended. Linking the experiment to tenant address histories, we find that nonresponses during moratoria translated into systematically different move-in patterns, shaping rental asset performance and market access. A simple search model explains these responses as landlords re-optimizing when enforcement is suspended.

JEL-codes: J15 R31 R38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
Note: PE
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