Bargaining and Dynamic Competition

Shanglyu Deng, Dun Jia, Mario Leccese and Andrew Sweeting

No 32360, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Industries with significant scale economies or learning-by-doing may come to be dominated by a single firm. Economists have studied how likely this is to happen, and whether it is efficient, using models where buyers are price or quantity takers, even though these industries are often also characterized by buyer-seller negotiations. We extend the dynamic “learning-by-doing and forgetting” model of Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite (2010) to allow for Nash-in-Nash bargaining over prices. Price-taking and the social planner solution are captured as special cases. We show that sellers’ dynamic incentives, market concentration and welfare can change sharply, and non-monotonically, as one moves away from the price-taking assumption. We study the implications of buyer bargaining power for the existence of multiple equilibria, the design of subsidy policies and the welfare effects of policies designed to increase competition.

JEL-codes: C73 D21 D43 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
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