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Framing and Free Riding: Emotional Responses and Punishment in Social Dilemma Games

Robin Cubitt, Michalis Drouvelis and Simon Gächter

No 2008-02, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: In this paper, we report an experimental investigation of the effect of framing on social preferences, as revealed in a one-shot linear public goods game. We use two indicators to measure social preferences: self-reported emotional responses; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval, punishment. Our findings are that, for a given pattern of contributions, neither punishment nor emotion depends on the Give versus Take framing that we manipulate. To this extent, they suggest that the social preferences we observe are robust to framing effects.

Keywords: framing effects; punishment; emotions; public goods experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D01 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Journal Article: Framing and free riding: emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games (2011) Downloads
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