Communication with Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment

Valeria Burdea, Maria Montero and Martin Sefton

No 2020-11, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially veriï¬ able information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be veriï¬ ed. We compare a treatment where the receiver chooses which dimension to verify with one where the sender has this veriï¬ cation control. We ï¬ nd signiï¬ cant differences in outcomes across treatments. However, receivers’ payoffs do not differ signiï¬ cantly across treatments, suggesting they are not hurt by delegating veriï¬ cation control. We also show that in both treatments the receiver’s best reply to senders’ observed behavior is close to the optimal commitment strategy identiï¬ ed by Glazer and Rubinstein.

Keywords: communication; partially verifiable messages; verification control; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment (2023)
Working Paper: Communication with Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notcdx:2020-11

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