Commitment and Observability in Games
Kyle Bagwell
No 1014, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Abstract:
Models of commitment make two assumptions: there is a first mover, and his action is perfectly observed by the subsequent mover. The purpose of this paper is to disentangle these two assumptions, in order to see if a strategic benefit from commitment remains when the first-mover's choice is imperfectly observed. The basic finding is that the first-mover advantage is eliminated when there is even a slight amount of noise associated with the observation of the first-mover's selection.
Date: 1992-11
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Journal Article: Commitment and observability in games (1995) 
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