Single and Multi-Dimensional Optimal Auctions - A Network Approach

Alexey Malakhov and Rakesh V. Vohra

No 1397, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: This paper highlights connections between the discrete and continuous approaches to optimal auction design with single and multi-dimensional types. We provide an interpretaion of an optimal auction design problem in terms of a linear program that is an instance of a parametric shortest path problem on a lattice. We also solve some cases explicitly in the discrete framework.

Keywords: Auctions; Networks; Linear Programming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C70 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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