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Common Agency with Informed Principals: Menus and Signals

Simone Galperti

No 1541, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: In this paper I consider games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. I focus on the problem of characterizing the equilibrium outcomes of such games. I first show that, to solve this problem, one can invoke neither Myerson’s Inscrutability Principle, which holds in agency games with one informed principal, nor the Extended Taxation Principle, which holds in common-agency games with uninformed principals. I then provide two characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes: one for games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and one for games in which they participate with the agent in making such decisions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D82, D83, D86

Keywords: Common agency; informed principals; Inscrutability Principals; Extended Taxation Principle; menus; signals; direct mechanisms Principle; menus; signals; direct revelation mechanisms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals (2015) Downloads
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