Rapid Evolution under Inertia

Thomas Norman

No 299, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes m x m pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in the presence of switching costs, due to the creation of new absorbing inertia states that allow Ellison`s (Review of Economic Studies 67, 2000, 17-45) step-by-step evolution to occur.

Keywords: Evolution; Mutations; Long-run Equilibrium; Waiting Times; Inertia; Switching Costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Rapid evolution under inertia (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:299

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