A Two-Sided Auction for Legacy Loans

Lawrence M. Ausubel () and Peter Cramton
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Lawrence M. Ausubel: Economics Department, University of Maryland, https://www.econ.umd.edu

Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton

Abstract: On Monday, 23 March 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner presented the Public-Private Investment Program as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis (www.financialstability.gov). The Treasury’s description still leaves many issues unanswered. We flesh out the auction design for legacy loans. A two-sided auction is required. Both banks and private investors must compete in a transparent and competitive process.

Keywords: Auctions; financial auctions; financial crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 G01 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 3 pages
Date: 2009, Revised 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-exp
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Published in Working Paper, University of Maryland, March 2009

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09tsall

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