Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services

Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel (), Gregory Rosston () and Andrzej Skrzypacz

Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton

Abstract: Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.

Keywords: Auctions; spectrum auctions; market design; package auction; clock auction; combinatorial auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2012, Revised 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Law and Economics, 54:4, S167-S188, 2011

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Related works:
Journal Article: Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (2011)
Working Paper: Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (2011)
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