The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts

Patrick Schmitz

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We revisit the contract-theoretic literature on privatization initiated by Hart et al. (1997). This literature has two major shortcomings. First, it is focused on ex-ante investment incentives, whereas ex-post inefficiencies which are ubiquitous in the real world cannot be explained. Second, ownership does not matter when incentive contracts can be written. Both shortcomings are due to the fact that this literature has studied the case of symmetric information only. We explore how asymmetric information leads to different kinds of ex-post inefficiencies depending on the ownership structure. Moreover, we show that under asymmetric information ownership matters even when incentive contracts are feasible.

Keywords: incomplete contracts; privatization; control rights; asymmetric information; investment incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 D86 H11 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts (2023)
Working Paper: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:117742

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