Asymmetric and Endogenous Within-Group Communication in Competitive Coordination Games

Timothy Cason, Roman Sheremeta and Jingjing Zhang

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Within-group communication in competitive coordination games has been shown to increase competition between groups and lower efficiency. This study further explores potentially harmful effects of communication, by addressing the questions of (i) asymmetric communication and (ii) the endogenous emergence of communication. Our theoretical analysis provides testable hypotheses regarding the effect of communication on competitive behavior and efficiency. We test these predictions using a laboratory experiment. The experiment shows that although asymmetric communication is not as harmful as symmetric communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency relative to the case when neither group can communicate. Moreover, groups vote to endogenously open communication channels even though this leads to lower payoffs and efficiency.

Keywords: between-group competition; within-group competition; communication; coordination; contests; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67664/1/MPRA_paper_67664.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76986/1/MPRA_paper_67664.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76986/9/MPRA_paper_76986.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games (2017)
Working Paper: Asymmetric and Endogenous Within-Group Communication in Competitive Coordination Games (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:67664

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter (winter@lmu.de).