3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting Algorithm

Steven Brams () and Peter Landweber

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We describe a 3-person, 2-cut envy-free cake-cutting algorithm, inspired by a continuous moving-knife procedure, that does not require that the players continuously move knifes across the cake. By having the players submit their value functions over the cake to a referee—rather than move knives according to these functions—the referee can ensure that the division is not only envy-free but also maximin. In addition, the referee can use the value functions to find a maximally equitable division, whereby the players receive equally valued shares that are maximal, but this allocation may not be envy-free.

Keywords: Fair division; cake-cutting; envy-freeness; equitability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C72 I31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:84683

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