Details about Steven J. Brams

Workplace:

New York University

Access statistics for papers by Steven J. Brams.

Last updated 2009-08-25. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pbr76

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Working Papers

2009

1. Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation
   Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
2. The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany

2008

3. Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
4. How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
5. Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany

2007

6. Stabilizing Power Sharing
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
7. The Instability of Power Sharing
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany

2003

8. Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters
   Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations
   See also Journal Article in Public Choice (2005)
9. Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
   Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
   See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2005)
10. Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations

2002

11. Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    Also in Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (2002)

2001

12. Cake Division with Minimal Cuts: Envy-Free Procedures for 3 Person, 4 Persons, and Beyond
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
13. Games That End in a Bang or a Whimper
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
14. Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations

2000

15. A Nail-Biting Election
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2001)
16. Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?
    Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques
    Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (2000)
    Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ (2000)
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2002)
17. Fair Division of Indivisible Items
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
    See also Journal Article in Theory and Decision (2003)
18. Paradoxes of Fair Division
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations

1999

19. Competitive Fair Division
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Political Economy (2001)
20. The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1998

21. Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2000)
22. Fallback Bargaining
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
23. Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
24. To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
25. Voting Procedures
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Chapter (2002)

1997

26. Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
27. Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
28. Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
29. The Truel
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
30. Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations

1996

31. A Procedure for Divorce Settlements
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
32. Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
33. Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
34. Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
35. The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
36. The Paradox of Multiple Elections
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (1998)

1995

37. A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
38. Fair Division and Politics
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
39. Game Theory and Emotions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
40. How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
41. Modeling Free Choice in Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1994

42. Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
43. Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
44. The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
45. When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations

1993

46. Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
47. Fair Division by Point Allocation
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
48. Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1992

49. An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
50. Cycles of Conflict
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
51. Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
52. Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
53. Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
54. Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
55. Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations

1991

56. A Generic Negotiation Game
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
57. Arbitration Procedures
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
58. Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
59. Games Theory and Literature
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (1994)
60. Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
61. When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
62. Yes-No Voting
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations

1990

63. APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989)
    See also Journal Article in Public Choice (1991)
64. ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION STRTEGIES THAT INDUCE COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
65. CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
66. Sequential Arbitration Procedures
    Working Papers, York (Canada) - Department of Economics
    Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989)
67. THE BOX PROBLEM: TO SWITCH OR NOT TO SWITCH?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
68. UNRAVELING IN EXCHANGE GAMES
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations

1989

69. COALITION VOTING
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
70. CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1988

71. ARE CRISIS RATIONAL? A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
72. Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in European Journal of Political Economy (1991)
73. OPTIMAL CHEATING AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES UNDER INF
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
74. Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations

1987

75. Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
76. Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
77. National Security Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
78. The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations

1986

79. Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
80. Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
81. The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
82. The Probability of Nuclear War
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
83. Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
84. Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations

1985

85. Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
86. Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
87. New Chairman Paradoxes
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
88. Rational De-Escalation
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
89. The Path to Stable Deterrence
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
90. Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1984

91. Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
92. Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
93. Optimal Deterrence
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1983

94. Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
95. The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1982

96. Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
97. Threat Power in Sequential Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations

1981

98. Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations

1980

99. Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
100. Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
101. Nonmyoptic Equilibria
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
102. Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
     See also Journal Article in Mathematical Social Sciences (1982)

Journal Articles

2008

1. Proportional pie-cutting
   International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, 36, (3), 353-367

2007

2. A minimax procedure for electing committees
   Public Choice, 2007, 132, (3), 401-420 View citations
3. Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings
   Public Choice, 2007, 131, (3), 465-468

2006

4. Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election
   Public Choice, 2006, 128, (3), 361-366
5. The normative turn in public choice
   Public Choice, 2006, 127, (3), 245-250

2005

6. Forming stable coalitions: The process matters
   Public Choice, 2005, 125, (1), 67-94 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2003)
7. Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations
   Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 2005, 6, (2), 1
8. Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 25, (2), 457-474 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2003)

2004

9. Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond
   Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, 48, (3), 251-269 View citations

2003

10. FAIR DIVISION OF INDIVISIBLE ITEMS
    Theory and Decision, 2003, 55, (2), 147-180 View citations
    See also Working Paper (2000)

2002

11. Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40, (2), 185-202
    See also Working Paper (2000)

2001

12. A nail-biting election
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18, (3), 409-414 View citations
    See also Working Paper (2000)
13. Competitive Fair Division
    Journal of Political Economy, 2001, 109, (2), 418-443 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1999)

2000

14. Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17, (2), 247-267
    See also Working Paper (1998)

1998

15. The paradox of multiple elections
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, 15, (2), 211-236 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1996)

1996

16. Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, 13, (4), 397-417 View citations

1994

17. Game Theory and Literature
    Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 6, (1), 32-54 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1991)

1991

18. Approval Voting in Practice
    Public Choice, 1991, 71, (1-2), 1-17 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1990)
19. Final-offer arbitration with a bonus
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1991, 7, (1), 79-92 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1988)

1982

20. Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1982, 3, (4), 373-388
    See also Working Paper (1980)

Books

2002

1. Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible, vol 1
   MIT Press Books, The MIT Press View citations

Chapters

2007

1. Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures
   A chapter in Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures, 2007

2002

2. Voting procedures
   Chapter 04 in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 1, pp 173-236 View citations
   Also in Chapter 30 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 1994, vol. 2, pp 1055-1089 (1994) View citations
   See also Working Paper (1998)