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Details about Steven J. Brams
Access statistics for papers by Steven J. Brams.
Last updated 2009-08-25. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service .
Short-id: pbr76
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Journal Articles Books Chapters
Working Papers
2009
Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2008
Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2007
Stabilizing Power Sharing
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
The Instability of Power Sharing
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2003
Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations
See also Journal Article in Public Choice (2005)
Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2005)
Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
2002
Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Also in Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (2002)
2001
Cake Division with Minimal Cuts: Envy-Free Procedures for 3 Person, 4 Persons, and Beyond
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Games That End in a Bang or a Whimper
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
2000
A Nail-Biting Election
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2001)
Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?
Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques
Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (2000) Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ (2000)
See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2002)
Fair Division of Indivisible Items
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
See also Journal Article in Theory and Decision (2003)
Paradoxes of Fair Division
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
1999
Competitive Fair Division
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
See also Journal Article in Journal of Political Economy (2001)
The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1998
Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2000)
Fallback Bargaining
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Voting Procedures
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
See also Chapter (2002)
1997
Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
The Truel
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
1996
A Procedure for Divorce Settlements
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
The Paradox of Multiple Elections
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (1998)
1995
A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Fair Division and Politics
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Game Theory and Emotions
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Modeling Free Choice in Games
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1994
Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
1993
Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Fair Division by Point Allocation
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1992
An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Cycles of Conflict
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
1991
A Generic Negotiation Game
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Arbitration Procedures
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Games Theory and Literature
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (1994)
Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Yes-No Voting
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
1990
APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989)
See also Journal Article in Public Choice (1991)
ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION STRTEGIES THAT INDUCE COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Sequential Arbitration Procedures
Working Papers, York (Canada) - Department of Economics
Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989)
THE BOX PROBLEM: TO SWITCH OR NOT TO SWITCH?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
UNRAVELING IN EXCHANGE GAMES
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
1989
COALITION VOTING
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1988
ARE CRISIS RATIONAL? A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
See also Journal Article in European Journal of Political Economy (1991)
OPTIMAL CHEATING AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES UNDER INF
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
1987
Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
National Security Games
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
1986
Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
The Probability of Nuclear War
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
1985
Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
New Chairman Paradoxes
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Rational De-Escalation
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
The Path to Stable Deterrence
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1984
Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Optimal Deterrence
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1983
Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1982
Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Threat Power in Sequential Games
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
1981
Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
1980
Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Nonmyoptic Equilibria
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations
Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
See also Journal Article in Mathematical Social Sciences (1982)
Journal Articles
2008
Proportional pie-cutting
International Journal of Game Theory , 2008, 36 , (3), 353-367
2007
A minimax procedure for electing committees
Public Choice , 2007, 132 , (3), 401-420 View citations
Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings
Public Choice , 2007, 131 , (3), 465-468
2006
Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election
Public Choice , 2006, 128 , (3), 361-366
The normative turn in public choice
Public Choice , 2006, 127 , (3), 245-250
2005
Forming stable coalitions: The process matters
Public Choice , 2005, 125 , (1), 67-94 View citations
See also Working Paper (2003)
Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy , 2005, 6 , (2), 1
Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
Social Choice and Welfare , 2005, 25 , (2), 457-474 View citations
See also Working Paper (2003)
2004
Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond
Mathematical Social Sciences , 2004, 48 , (3), 251-269 View citations
2003
FAIR DIVISION OF INDIVISIBLE ITEMS
Theory and Decision , 2003, 55 , (2), 147-180 View citations
See also Working Paper (2000)
2002
Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
Games and Economic Behavior , 2002, 40 , (2), 185-202
See also Working Paper (2000)
2001
A nail-biting election
Social Choice and Welfare , 2001, 18 , (3), 409-414 View citations
See also Working Paper (2000)
Competitive Fair Division
Journal of Political Economy , 2001, 109 , (2), 418-443 View citations
See also Working Paper (1999)
2000
Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
Social Choice and Welfare , 2000, 17 , (2), 247-267
See also Working Paper (1998)
1998
The paradox of multiple elections
Social Choice and Welfare , 1998, 15 , (2), 211-236 View citations
See also Working Paper (1996)
1996
Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
Social Choice and Welfare , 1996, 13 , (4), 397-417 View citations
1994
Game Theory and Literature
Games and Economic Behavior , 1994, 6 , (1), 32-54 View citations
See also Working Paper (1991)
1991
Approval Voting in Practice
Public Choice , 1991, 71 , (1-2), 1-17 View citations
See also Working Paper (1990)
Final-offer arbitration with a bonus
European Journal of Political Economy , 1991, 7 , (1), 79-92 View citations
See also Working Paper (1988)
1982
Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries
Mathematical Social Sciences , 1982, 3 , (4), 373-388
See also Working Paper (1980)
Books
2002
Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible, vol 1
MIT Press Books, The MIT Press View citations
Chapters
2007
Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures
A chapter in Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures , 2007
2002
Voting procedures
Chapter 04 in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare , 2002, vol. 1, pp 173-236 View citations
Also in Chapter 30 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications , 1994, vol. 2, pp 1055-1089 (1994) View citations
See also Working Paper (1998)