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Details about Steven J. Brams

E-mail:
Homepage:http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/stevenbrams
Phone:(212) 998-8510
Postal address:Dept. of Politics New York University 19 West 4th St., 2nd Fl. New York, NY 10012 U.S.A.
Workplace:New York University

Access statistics for papers by Steven J. Brams.

Last updated 2014-07-20. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pbr76


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Working Papers

2014

  1. An algorithm for the proportional division of indivisible items
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
  2. Voting power in the Electoral College: The noncompetitive states count, too
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads

2013

  1. Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
  2. Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads

2012

  1. Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads

2011

  1. A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
    Also in Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics (2011) Downloads
  2. Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Public Choice (2014)
  3. N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
  4. Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Theoretical Politics (2012)
  5. Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
  6. When does approval voting make the "right choices"?
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads

2010

  1. A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
  2. Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
  3. Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
    Also in Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2009) Downloads

    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2013)
  4. Satisfaction approval voting
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (4)
  5. Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (3)

2009

  1. The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2012)

2008

  1. Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
  2. How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
  3. Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (2)

2007

  1. Stabilizing Power Sharing
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
  2. The Instability of Power Sharing
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads

2003

  1. Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters
    Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Downloads View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article in Public Choice (2005)
  2. Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2005)
  3. Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads View citations (1)

2002

  1. Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System
    Discussion Papers, Exeter University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations (1)
    Also in Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (2002) Downloads View citations (1)
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (2002) Downloads

2001

  1. Cake Division with Minimal Cuts: Envy-Free Procedures for 3 Person, 4 Persons, and Beyond
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. Games That End in a Bang or a Whimper
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  3. Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Theoretical Politics (2002)

2000

  1. A Nail-Biting Election
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2001)
  2. Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?
    Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques Downloads
    Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (2000) Downloads
    Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ (2000)

    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2002)
  3. Fair Division of Indivisible Items
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Theory and Decision (2003)
  4. Paradoxes of Fair Division
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1999

  1. Competitive Fair Division
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Political Economy (2001)
  2. The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1998

  1. Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2000)
  2. Fallback Bargaining
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads View citations (2)
  3. Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  4. To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  5. Voting Procedures
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads View citations (2)
    See also Chapter (2002)

1997

  1. Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  3. Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads View citations (1)
  4. The Truel
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  5. Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1996

  1. A Procedure for Divorce Settlements
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Theory and Decision (1998)
  3. Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Conflict Management and Peace Science (1996)
  4. Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  5. The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  6. The Paradox of Multiple Elections
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (1998)

1995

  1. A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. Fair Division and Politics
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  3. Game Theory and Emotions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  4. How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  5. Modeling Free Choice in Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1994

  1. Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  3. The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  4. When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads View citations (1)

1993

  1. Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. Fair Division by Point Allocation
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  3. Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1992

  1. An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads View citations (1)
  2. Cycles of Conflict
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  3. Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  4. Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  5. Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Conflict Management and Peace Science (1993)
  6. Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  7. Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1991

  1. A Generic Negotiation Game
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Theoretical Politics (1992)
  2. Arbitration Procedures
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  3. Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  4. Games Theory and Literature
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (1994)
  5. Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  6. When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  7. Yes-No Voting
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1990

  1. APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989) Downloads

    See also Journal Article in Public Choice (1991)
  2. ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION STRTEGIES THAT INDUCE COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  3. CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  4. Sequential Arbitration Procedures
    Working Papers, York (Canada) - Department of Economics View citations (1)
    Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989) Downloads
  5. THE BOX PROBLEM: TO SWITCH OR NOT TO SWITCH?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  6. UNRAVELING IN EXCHANGE GAMES
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1989

  1. COALITION VOTING
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1988

  1. ARE CRISIS RATIONAL? A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in European Journal of Political Economy (1991)
  3. OPTIMAL CHEATING AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES UNDER INF
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  4. Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads View citations (1)

1987

  1. Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  3. National Security Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  4. The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Public Choice (1988)

1986

  1. Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  3. The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  4. The Probability of Nuclear War
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Peace Research (1989)
  5. Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  6. Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1985

  1. Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  3. New Chairman Paradoxes
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  4. Rational De-Escalation
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  5. The Path to Stable Deterrence
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  6. Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads View citations (2)

1984

  1. Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Management Science (1986)
  2. Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  3. Optimal Deterrence
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1983

  1. Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1982

  1. Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. Threat Power in Sequential Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1981

  1. Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads

1980

  1. Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  2. Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
  3. Nonmyoptic Equilibria
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads View citations (1)
  4. Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Mathematical Social Sciences (1982)

Journal Articles

2014

  1. Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009
    Public Choice, 2014, 158, (3), 525-539 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2011)

2013

  1. Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 41, (1), 1-18 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2010)

2012

  1. Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2012, 24, (4), 507-525 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2011)
  2. The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, 39, (2), 615-631 Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper (2009)

2010

  1. A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2010, 60, (3), 191-195 Downloads View citations (1)

2008

  1. Proportional pie-cutting
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, 36, (3), 353-367 Downloads View citations (4)

2007

  1. A minimax procedure for electing committees
    Public Choice, 2007, 132, (3), 401-420 Downloads View citations (17)
  2. Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings
    Public Choice, 2007, 131, (3), 465-468 Downloads

2006

  1. Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election
    Public Choice, 2006, 128, (3), 361-366 Downloads View citations (1)
  2. The normative turn in public choice
    Public Choice, 2006, 127, (3), 245-250 Downloads

2005

  1. Forming stable coalitions: The process matters
    Public Choice, 2005, 125, (1), 67-94 Downloads View citations (7)
    See also Working Paper (2003)
  2. Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 25, (2), 457-474 Downloads View citations (25)
    See also Working Paper (2003)

2004

  1. Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, 48, (3), 251-269 Downloads View citations (6)

2003

  1. FAIR DIVISION OF INDIVISIBLE ITEMS
    Theory and Decision, 2003, 55, (2), 147-180 Downloads View citations (7)
    See also Working Paper (2000)

2002

  1. Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40, (2), 185-202 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2000)
  2. Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2002, 14, (3), 359-383 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2001)

2001

  1. A nail-biting election
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18, (3), 409-414 Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper (2000)
  2. Competitive Fair Division
    Journal of Political Economy, 2001, 109, (2), 418-443 Downloads View citations (23)
    See also Working Paper (1999)
  3. Response to Randall Stone
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2001, 45, (2), 245-254 Downloads

2000

  1. Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17, (2), 247-267 Downloads View citations (8)
    See also Working Paper (1998)
  2. Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations
    Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2000, 6, (2), 1-11 Downloads

1998

  1. Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem
    Theory and Decision, 1998, 45, (3), 263-289 Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper (1996)
  2. Proportional Representation
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1998, 10, (2), 147-178 Downloads
  3. The paradox of multiple elections
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, 15, (2), 211-236 Downloads View citations (21)
    See also Working Paper (1996)

1996

  1. Camp David: Was The Agreement Fair?
    Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1996, 15, (1), 99-112 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (1996)
  2. Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, 13, (4), 397-417 View citations (6)

1995

  1. When is Size a Liability?
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1995, 7, (3), 301-316 Downloads

1994

  1. Game Theory and Literature
    Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 6, (1), 32-54 Downloads View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper (1991)

1993

  1. Intransigence in Negotiations
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1993, 37, (4), 692-708 Downloads
  2. Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples
    Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1993, 12, (2), 1-39 Downloads View citations (2)
    See also Working Paper (1992)

1992

  1. A Generic Negotiation Game
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1992, 4, (1), 53-66 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (1991)
  2. Putting the Other Side “On Notice†Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1992, 36, (3), 395-414 Downloads

1991

  1. Approval Voting in Practice
    Public Choice, 1991, 71, (1-2), 1-17 View citations (7)
    See also Working Paper (1990)
  2. Final-offer arbitration with a bonus
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1991, 7, (1), 79-92 Downloads View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper (1988)

1989

  1. The Probability of Nuclear War
    Journal of Peace Research, 1989, 26, (1), 91-99 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (1986)

1988

  1. The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
    Public Choice, 1988, 59, (2), 121-131 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (1987)

1987

  1. Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1987, 31, (4), 547-572 Downloads

1986

  1. Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
    Management Science, 1986, 32, (10), 1346-1355 Downloads View citations (16)
    See also Working Paper (1984)

1985

  1. Response to Rabow
    Management Science, 1985, 31, (3), 375-376 Downloads

1984

  1. Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences
    Public Choice, 1984, 44, (3), 397-410 Downloads View citations (2)

1983

  1. Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
    Management Science, 1983, 29, (8), 927-941 Downloads View citations (18)

1982

  1. Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1982, 3, (4), 373-388 Downloads View citations (2)
    See also Working Paper (1980)

1981

  1. Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections
    Public Choice, 1981, 36, (1), 89-114 Downloads View citations (1)
  2. Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting
    Public Choice, 1981, 37, (3), 425-434 Downloads View citations (1)
  3. Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games
    Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1981, 6, (1), 39-62 Downloads

1977

  1. Deception in 2 × 2 Games
    Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1977, 2, (2), 171-203 Downloads
  2. Unanimity in the supreme court: A game-theoretic explanation of the decision in the white house tapes case
    Public Choice, 1977, 32, (1), 67-83 Downloads View citations (1)

1975

  1. Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1975, 19, (4), 596-612 Downloads

1974

  1. When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be
    Public Choice, 1974, 17, (1), 11-25 Downloads

Books

2012

  1. Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds, vol 1
    MIT Press Books, The MIT Press
    Also in MIT Press Books, The MIT Press (2011) View citations (5)

2002

  1. Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible, vol 1
    MIT Press Books, The MIT Press View citations (1)

1996

  1. Fair Division
    Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press View citations (28)

Chapters

2007

  1. Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures
    (Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures)
    Princeton University Press Downloads

2002

  1. Voting procedures
    Chapter 04 in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 1, pp 173-236 Downloads View citations (24)
    Also in Chapter 30 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 1994, vol. 2, pp 1055-1089 (1994) Downloads View citations (4)

    See also Working Paper (1998)
 
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