Details about Steven J. Brams

E-mail:
Homepage:	http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/stevenbrams
Phone:	(212) 998-8510
Postal address:	Dept. of Politics New York University 19 West 4th St., 2nd Fl. New York, NY 10012 U.S.A.
Workplace:	New York University

Access statistics for papers by Steven J. Brams.

Last updated 2012-12-17. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pbr76

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Working Papers

2012

1. Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany

2011

2. A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
   Also in Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics (2011)
3. Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
4. N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
5. Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Theoretical Politics (2012)
6. Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
7. When does approval voting make the "right choices"?
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany

2010

8. A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
9. Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
10. Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
    Also in Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2009)
11. Satisfaction approval voting
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
12. Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)

2009

13. The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2012)

2008

14. Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
15. How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
16. Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)

2007

17. Stabilizing Power Sharing
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
18. The Instability of Power Sharing
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany

2003

19. Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters
    Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article in Public Choice (2005)
20. Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2005)
21. Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

2002

22. Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System
    Discussion Papers, Exeter University, Department of Economics
    Also in Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (2002) View citations (1)
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (2002)

2001

23. Cake Division with Minimal Cuts: Envy-Free Procedures for 3 Person, 4 Persons, and Beyond
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
24. Games That End in a Bang or a Whimper
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
25. Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

2000

26. A Nail-Biting Election
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2001)
27. Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?
    Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques
    Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (2000)
    Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ (2000)
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2002)
28. Fair Division of Indivisible Items
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in Theory and Decision (2003)
29. Paradoxes of Fair Division
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1999

30. Competitive Fair Division
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Political Economy (2001)
31. The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1998

32. Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2000)
33. Fallback Bargaining
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
34. Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
35. To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
36. Voting Procedures
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Chapter (2002)

1997

37. Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
38. Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
39. Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
40. The Truel
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
41. Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1996

42. A Procedure for Divorce Settlements
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
43. Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in Theory and Decision (1998)
44. Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
45. Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
46. The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
47. The Paradox of Multiple Elections
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (1998)

1995

48. A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
49. Fair Division and Politics
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
50. Game Theory and Emotions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
51. How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
52. Modeling Free Choice in Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1994

53. Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
54. Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
55. The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
56. When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1993

57. Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
58. Fair Division by Point Allocation
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
59. Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1992

60. An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
61. Cycles of Conflict
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
62. Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
63. Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
64. Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
65. Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
66. Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1991

67. A Generic Negotiation Game
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
68. Arbitration Procedures
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
69. Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
70. Games Theory and Literature
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (1994)
71. Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
72. When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
73. Yes-No Voting
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1990

74. APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989)
    See also Journal Article in Public Choice (1991)
75. ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION STRTEGIES THAT INDUCE COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
76. CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
77. Sequential Arbitration Procedures
    Working Papers, York (Canada) - Department of Economics
    Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989)
78. THE BOX PROBLEM: TO SWITCH OR NOT TO SWITCH?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
79. UNRAVELING IN EXCHANGE GAMES
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1989

80. COALITION VOTING
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
81. CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1988

82. ARE CRISIS RATIONAL? A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
83. Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article in European Journal of Political Economy (1991)
84. OPTIMAL CHEATING AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES UNDER INF
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
85. Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1987

86. Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
87. Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
88. National Security Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
89. The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1986

90. Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
91. Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
92. The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
93. The Probability of Nuclear War
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
94. Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
95. Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1985

96. Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
97. Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
98. New Chairman Paradoxes
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
99. Rational De-Escalation
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
100. The Path to Stable Deterrence
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
101. Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1984

102. Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
     See also Journal Article in Management Science (1986)
103. Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
104. Optimal Deterrence
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1983

105. Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
106. The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1982

107. Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
108. Threat Power in Sequential Games
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1981

109. Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1980

110. Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
111. Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
112. Nonmyoptic Equilibria
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
113. Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
     See also Journal Article in Mathematical Social Sciences (1982)

Journal Articles

2012

1. Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule
   Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2012, 24, (4), 507-525
   See also Working Paper (2011)
2. The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, 39, (2), 615-631
   See also Working Paper (2009)

2010

3. A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
   Mathematical Social Sciences, 2010, 60, (3), 191-195

2008

4. Proportional pie-cutting
   International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, 36, (3), 353-367 View citations (1)

2007

5. A minimax procedure for electing committees
   Public Choice, 2007, 132, (3), 401-420 View citations (12)
6. Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings
   Public Choice, 2007, 131, (3), 465-468

2006

7. Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election
   Public Choice, 2006, 128, (3), 361-366 View citations (1)
8. The normative turn in public choice
   Public Choice, 2006, 127, (3), 245-250

2005

9. Forming stable coalitions: The process matters
   Public Choice, 2005, 125, (1), 67-94 View citations (5)
   See also Working Paper (2003)
10. Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 25, (2), 457-474 View citations (19)
    See also Working Paper (2003)

2004

11. Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, 48, (3), 251-269 View citations (4)

2003

12. FAIR DIVISION OF INDIVISIBLE ITEMS
    Theory and Decision, 2003, 55, (2), 147-180 View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper (2000)

2002

13. Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40, (2), 185-202
    See also Working Paper (2000)

2001

14. A nail-biting election
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18, (3), 409-414 View citations (2)
    See also Working Paper (2000)
15. Competitive Fair Division
    Journal of Political Economy, 2001, 109, (2), 418-443 View citations (17)
    See also Working Paper (1999)

2000

16. Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17, (2), 247-267 View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper (1998)
17. Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations
    Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2000, 6, (2), 1

1998

18. Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem
    Theory and Decision, 1998, 45, (3), 263-289 View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper (1996)
19. The paradox of multiple elections
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, 15, (2), 211-236 View citations (18)
    See also Working Paper (1996)

1996

20. Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, 13, (4), 397-417 View citations (4)

1994

21. Game Theory and Literature
    Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 6, (1), 32-54 View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper (1991)

1991

22. Approval Voting in Practice
    Public Choice, 1991, 71, (1-2), 1-17 View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper (1990)
23. Final-offer arbitration with a bonus
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1991, 7, (1), 79-92 View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper (1988)

1986

24. Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
    Management Science, 1986, 32, (10), 1346-1355 View citations (12)
    See also Working Paper (1984)

1985

25. Response to Rabow
    Management Science, 1985, 31, (3), 375-376

1983

26. Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
    Management Science, 1983, 29, (8), 927-941 View citations (11)

1982

27. Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1982, 3, (4), 373-388
    See also Working Paper (1980)

Books

2011

1. Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds, vol 1
   MIT Press Books, The MIT Press View citations (2)

2002

2. Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible, vol 1
   MIT Press Books, The MIT Press

1996

3. Fair Division
   Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press View citations (27)

Chapters

2007

1. Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures
   A chapter in Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures, 2007

2002

2. Voting procedures
   Chapter 04 in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 1, pp 173-236 View citations (19)
   Also in Chapter 30 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 1994, vol. 2, pp 1055-1089 (1994) View citations (4)
   See also Working Paper (1998)