On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, plurality voting, Borda methods and Condorcet winners to our setting from the point of view of their consistency and internal stability properties.

Keywords: Internal Stability; Consistency; Efficiency; Anonymity, Neutrality; Participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-pol
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Published in Theory and Decision 84 (2018): pp. 83-97

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Related works:
Journal Article: On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:91714

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